The Bitcoin network has offered a new way of securely performing financial transactions over the insecure network. Nevertheless, this ability comes with the cost of storing a large (distributed) ledger, which has become unsuitable for personal devices of any kind. Although the simplified payment verification (SPV) clients can address this storage issue, a Bitcoin SPV client has to rely on other Bitcoin nodes to obtain its transaction history and the current approaches offer no privacy guarantees to the SPV clients.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, we have seen a great interest in public blockchain in the community. The Bitcoin blockchain offered a way to provide security and privacy for financial transactions. However, due to the huge adoption by the community, the size of the Bitcoin blockchain has become too large for small and resource-constrained devices such as personal laptops or mobile phones, raising not only performance but also privacy concerns in the community. As of October 2018, the size of the unindexed Bitcoin blockchain is 230 GB.
To this end, Bitcoin's simplified payment verification (SPV) client has become a widely-adopted solution to resolve a storage problem for constrained devices. Nakamoto [36] sketched the idea of SPV clients in the Bitcoin whitepaper, and in the Bitcoin improvement proposal 37 (BIP37) [34] , Mike Hearn combines Nakamoto's idea with the use of Bloom filters to standardize the design of Bitcoin SPV clients. This design has become de facto standard and been used by other SPV clients such as BitcoinJ [4] and Electrum [5] .
The core of SPV clients is in only downloading and then verifying part of the blockchain that is relevant to the SPV client itself. In particular, the SPV client loads its addresses into a Bloom filter and sends the filter to a Bitcoin full client, and The Bitcoin full client will use that filter to identify if a block contains transactions that are relevant to the SPV client, and once it finds the block, it will send a modified block that only contains relevant transactions along with Merkle proofs for those transactions.
However, the current SPV solution relied on Bloom filters raises security and privacy concerns to the SPV clients when communicates with potentially malicious nodes. In particular, Gervais et al. [25] show that it is possible for a malicious node to learn several addresses of the client from the Bloom filter with high probability. Moreover, if the adversarial node can collect two filters issued by the same client, then a considerable number of addresses owned by the client will be leaked.
To provide a strong privacy guarantee for SPV clients, one needs a solution that can hide wallets/addresses queried by the SPV clients. While such a system can be built using private information retrieval (PIR) primitive, the existing cryptographic PIR solutions [30] are not been practical to scale to handle millions of Bitcoin users. On the other hand, to gain more efficiency, one can use ORAM and trusted execution environment to propose generic PIR systems [28] , [23] , [42] . However, as it becomes apparent in the later in this paper, naively combining ORAM scheme as it is with TEE makes the practicality of those generic systems questionable when used in a large network like Bitcoin due to the lack of concurrency in ORAM as well as the limitation of TEE with restricted memory.
Our Contribution. This work aims not only to design a system that provides SPV clients with privacy-preserving access to the Bitcoin blockchain data but also to consider other practical aspects on how to scale such a system to handle client requests in a large-scale. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
Firstly, we present a novel design for a system that can handle up to thousands of requests per minute from Bitcoin SPV clients based on a restricted access Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM) and the trusted execution capabilities of TEE. In particular, one of the main contributions of our design is the optimization access in the prominent treebased ORAM schemes that allow those ORAM schemes to support concurrent accesses which is essential for handling SPV clients' requests. In this design, the access privacy guarantee is still maintained because of our natural assumption that the rational Bitcoin SPV clients should only query for their particular transaction once before the arrival of a new Bitcoin block. Nevertheless, we later show that even when the SPV clients are irrational then the privacy for such clients is only compromised for a short period of time. The security guarantee of T 3 also relies on the trusted execution capabilities of TEE that allows SPV clients to perform ORAM operations securely and remotely. Our generic design works with other blockchains, any tree-based ORAM schemes [43] , [44] , [49] , and any TEE with attestation capability.
Secondly, we implemented a prototype of T 3 and evaluated its performance to demonstrate the practicality of our approach. More specifically, we extracted the unspent transaction outputs set of Bitcoin in October 2018 and used it to measure the performance of the system when handling clients' requests. The implementation of T 3 also adopts standard techniques (i.e., oblivious operations using cmov [42] , [10] , [40] ) to be secure against known side-channel attacks [32] , [31] , [51] . Moreover, the use of recursive ORAM constructions in T 3 makes the system much more suitable for TEE with restricted trusted memory like Intel SGX. We then show that the running time of the ORAM read access decreases linearly with the number of the threads used (e.g, up to 8× performance gained with 4 threads).
Finally, we conclude that putting natural restrictions on the access patterns on oblivious memory can lead to significant performance improvement and better ORAM design. While the applicability of T 3 in cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin is apparent, we believe our work will also motivate further research on oblivious memory with restricted access patterns.
Concurrent Work. The soon-to-be published BITE system [9] also employs the Oblivious Database construction for SPV client privacy. The main idea of the BITE construction is to combine the use of non-recursive PATH-ORAM [44] construction and TEE (such as Intel SGX) to propose a generic system that offers SPV client with oblivious access to the database. However, BITE did not address several shortcomings of using PATH-ORAM as it is and TEE with restricted memory in practice. In particular, the BITE design did not consider use recursive ORAM constructions to reduce the trusted memory usage; therefore, the efficiency of the system will be degraded once the size of the database gets too large. Moreover, due to the inherent lack of concurrency in tree-based ORAM such as PATH-ORAM, naively using Path-ORAM makes BITE unsuitable for handling thousands of Bitcoin client's requests per minute as well as thousands of updates every fixed period of times (e.g., 10 minutes for Bitcoin). In this work, we investigate the use of both recursive PATH-ORAM and recursive CIRCUIT-ORAM to understand the actual performance and the actual storage overhead put on the server. Importantly, we propose a two-tree ORAM design to further enhance the performance of standard ORAM accesses as well as to allow concurrent requests from the SPV client.
II. DESIGN GOALS AND SOLUTION OVERVIEW
In this section, we define the system components, outline our security goals, and give an overview of how our system works.
A. System Components
There are three key components of this system: the Bitcoin network, a client, and a untrusted server. The Bitcoin network is a set of nodes that maintains the Bitcoin blockchain, and the network validates and relays the new Bitcoin block produced by miners. A client is a Bitcoin simplified payment verification node that remotely connects to the secure TEE on the untrusted server to perform oblivious searches on the unspent transaction output (UTXO) set. The client is also able to connect to the Bitcoin Network to obtain other network metadata such as the latest Bitcoin block header. A server is the untrusted entity made up of two components: an untrusted server and several trusted TEEs (i.e., the managing, reading, and writing TEEs). Moreover, the untrusted server stores three encrypted databases which are the read-once ORAM tree, the original ORAM tree, and the Bitcoin header chain. The untrusted server hosts a potentially malicious bitcoin client (e.g., bitcoind) that handles the communication with the Bitcoin Network.
B. Design Goals
The goal of our system is to leverage the trusted execution capabilities of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) with attestation to design a public Bitcoin full node that supports oblivious search and update on the current Bitcoin unspent transaction output database. Our system aims to provide data confidentiality and privacy to Bitcoin SPV clients in a large scale by using standard encryption and Oblivious RAM techniques on the current set of unspent transaction outputs. The main goals that T 3 tries to achieve are: 1) Privacy. T 3 aims to provide privacy and confidentiality to SPV clients' requests. In particular, the system allows SPV clients to obliviously search its relevant transactions without revealing their addresses to potentially malicious providers by using TEE to encrypt the data and using ORAM schemes to eliminate known side channel leakages [40] , [10] , [28] , [42] . 2) Validity. In our design, the SPV client should be able to obtain valid information based on the provided addresses, and a malicious adversary should not able to tamper the Blockchain data with invalid transaction outputs. 3) Completeness. The system should provide clients with access to most of its relevant transactions in order to determine balance or to obtain essential information to form new transactions. 4) Efficiency. The system should be practical to deploy.
More specifically, the system should be efficient enough to handle different concurrent SPV clients' requests without compromising the privacy of the clients. 
C. Solution Overview
The idea of using ORAM schemes and trusted execution environment to construct database systems that support oblivious accesses has been investigated by the research community [28] , [23] , [42] . However, the efficiency and scalability of those systems are hampered by the lack of concurrency of traditional ORAM schemes [44] , [49] .
In this work, we design T 3 to overcome the limitations of efficiency and concurrency plaguing existing systems. Our design is motivated by the following observations. The first observation is that each ORAM access in a standard treebased ORAM settings is a combination of two operations: a read-path operation and an eviction operation. By separating the effects two operations into two different trees: a readonce ORAM tree and an original ORAM tree, one can use read-path operation on the read-once ORAM tree to handle clients' requests simultaneously while performing a non-blocking eviction operation on the original ORAM tree sequentially. This design is also independently investigated by ConcurORAM [14] ; however, their design is not suited for TEEs with limited trusted memory (such as Intel SGX). We elaborate on this in the coming sections.
The second observation is that the access privacy guarantee of this approach relies the characteristic of the Bitcoin blockchain. In particular, the Bitcoin network generates new Bitcoin block on average of 10 minutes, and if we require T 3 to periodically synchronize these the two trees, then the privacy of clients' queries are preserved. Moreover, if we assume that upon receiving transactions belonged to its addresses, the rational client should not query same transactions again until the next block arrives, the proposed approach on the separation of read-path and eviction procedure not only does not affect the privacy guarantees of ORAM access but also allows T 3 to handle much more clients' requests. More importantly, we also argue that even when the SPV clients are irrational by submitting requests for the same transaction more than one, the privacy of those clients is only compromised for a short period of time (i.e., 10 minutes for the Bitcoin network) because T 3 will always synchronize the old instance of the read-once ORAM tree with the more updated instance of the original ORAM tree. With the intuition of T 3 described above, we outline the workflow of our design:
Server Initialization 1 -8 : Initially, the managing TEE will initialize a writing TEE that creates an empty ORAM tree. For each of Bitcoin block obtained from the network, the managing TEE verifies the proof of work of the block before passing relevant update data to the writing TEE in order to populate the ORAM tree. With the current size of the Bitcoin blockchain, this operation might take several hours. However, once the TEEs catch up with the current state of the Bitcoin blockchain, we expect that the TEE only has to perform a batch of update accesses on the ORAM tree every 10 minute. When the initialization is completed, the managing TEE creates two copies of the ORAM tree which are the read-once ORAM tree and the original ORAM tree.
Oblivious read-once Protocol 1 -6 : In order to obtain its unspent outputs, the client first performs the remote attestation to the managing TEE. The remote attestation mechanism allows the client to verify the correctness of program execution inside the TEE. More importantly, after a successful attestation, the client can use standard key exchange mechanism (i.e. Diffie-Hellman's key exchange) to share a secret session key with the TEE in order to establish a secure connection with the managing TEE. Upon receiving client's connection requests, the managing TEE creates a reading TEE with its own copies of the ORAM position map and the ORAM stash to handle client subsequent requests. Next, after having a secure channel, the client will send his Bitcoin addresses along with the proof of ownership of those addresses to the TEE (e.g., the knowledge of the public key along with a signature to a random nonce or the preimage of the public key hash). The reading TEE will use a mapping function to map Bitcoin addresses into the ORAM block identification number and performs readonce ORAM access on the ORAM tree. In particular, those read-once ORAM access do not involve the eviction procedure which requires re-encrypting and remapping the ORAM block. The eviction procedure will be performed on the original ORAM tree by the writing TEE.
Oblivious Write Protocol 1 -8 : The T 3 requires to update the ORAM tree via batch of write accesses every 10 minutes on average. In particular, T 3 will rely on a standard Bitcoin client to handle the communication with the Bitcoin network to obtain blockchain data 1 . Thus, T 3 needs to verify the block relayed by a potentially malicious Bitcoin client before updating the ORAM tree. More specifically, in the design, T 3 stores a separate Bitcoin header chain to verify the proof of work and the validity of all transactions inside a Bitcoin block. After the verification, the managing TEE forms a batch of ORAM updates and delegates those updates to the writing TEE. Once those updates are finished, the managing TEE will queue up read requests from SPV clients in order to allow the writing TEE to finish the eviction requests from the read TEEs during the updating interval. As soon as the writing TEE finishes performing those eviction requests, the managing TEE updates the position map and stash, and makes the ORAM tree used by the writing TEE become the new ORAM tree used by reading TEE. At this point, the reading TEE can use the new tree instance to respond to clients' requests while the writing TEE performs the eviction procedure on another copy of the same ORAM tree.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND THREAT MODEL

A. Trusted Execution Environment
The design of T 3 relies on a trusted execution environment (TEE) to prove the correctness of the computations. In particular, TEE is a trusted hardware that provides both confidentiality and integrity of computations as well as offer an authentication mechanism, known as attestation, for the client to verify computation correctness. In this work, we chose Intel SGX [18] to be the building block of our system. However, with minor modifications, the design of our system can be extended to any TEE with attestation capabilities such as Keystone-enclave [7] and Sanctum [19] as other trusted execution environments might not have the same strengths/weaknesses as Intel SGX.
Intel SGX is a set of hardware instructions introduced with the 6th Generation Intel Core processors. We use Intel SGX as a TEE for the execution of an ORAM controller on the untrusted server. The relevant elements of SGX are as follows.
Enclave is the trusted execution unit that is located in a dedicated portion of the physical RAM called the enclave page cache (EPC). The SGX processor makes sure that all other software components on the system cannot access the enclave memory. Intel SGX supports both local and remote attestation mechanisms to allow remote parties or local enclaves to authenticate and verify if the program is correctly executed within an SGX context. More importantly, attestation protocols provide the authentication required for a key exchange protocol [18] , i.e., after a successful attestation, the concerned parties can agree on a shared session key using Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [22] and create a secure channel.
Limitations. Intel SGX comes with various limitations which have been uncovered by the academic community over the past few years. In particular, some of the limitations are:
• Side Channel Attacks: While Intel SGX provides security guarantees against direct memory attacks, it does not provide systematic protection mechanisms against side channel attacks such as page table-based [51] , [31] , cachebased [13] , and branch-prediction-based [32] . Through page table and cache attacks, a privileged attacker can observe cache-line-granular (i.e., 64B) memory access patterns from the enclave program. On the other hand, the branch-prediction attack can potentially leak all the control-flow taken by the enclave program. • Enclave Page Cache Limit: The size of the Enclave Page Cache (EPC) is limited to around 96MB [11] . Although Intel SGX alleviates this limitation by supporting pageswapping between trusted memory region and untrusted memory region, this operation is expensive due to encryption and integrity verification [18] , [11] . • System Calls: Intel SGX programs are restricted to ring-3 privileges and therefore rely on the untrusted OS for ring-0 operations such as file and network I/O. There are various previous works which try to solve this problem using library OSes [47] and/or other techniques [28] .
Oblivious Operations inside the Enclave. Several techniques [40] , [28] , [42] , [37] have been introduced to mitigate side-channel attacks on the SGX. In this work, we built our system based on the implementations of both Zerotrace [42] and Obliviate [10] . Therefore, our system inherited standard secure operations from both of these libraries. In particular, their implementations use an oblivious access wrapper by using the x86 instruction cmov as introduced by Raccoon [40] .
Using cmov, the wrapper accesses every single byte of a memory object while reading or writing only the required bytes in memory. From the perspective of an attacker (which can only observe access-patterns), this is the same as reading or modifying every byte in memory. We refer readers to [42] , [10] , [40] for detailed description of these oblivious operations.
B. Oblivious Random Access Memory
Oblivious Random Access Memory (ORAM) was first introduced by Goldreich et al [26] for software protection against piracy. The core of ORAM is to hide the access patterns resulted by reading and writing accesses on encrypted data. The security of ORAM can be described as follows.
denote a sequence of accesses where op i ∈ {read, write}, bid i is the identifier, and data i denotes the data being written. For an ORAM scheme Σ, let Access Σ ( Tree-based ORAM schemes. One strategy of designing an ORAM scheme is to follow the tree paradigm proposed by Shi et al. [43] and Stefanov et al. [44] . In tree based ORAM, the client encrypts their database into N different encrypted data blocks and obliviously stores those data blocks in a binary tree of height log 2 (N ) . Each node in the tree is called a bucket, and each bucket can contain up to Z blocks. The client also maintains a position map, to indicate which path a data block resides on. Finally, the client needs to have a stash to store a path retrieved from the server.
We follow the same generalization of a tree-based ORAM access described in [28] . Each access in both ORAM schemes requires two operations: a ReadPath operation and an Evict operation. Intuitively, ReadPath takes as input the ORAM block identifier, bid, accesses the position map, and retrieves the path that block bid resides onto the stash, S. After performing ORAM access (i.e. read/write) on the identified block, the block is assigned to a different path and pushed back to the tree via the Evict operation. In general, the Evict operation takes a stash and the assigned path as input, writes back blocks from stash to the assigned path, and update the position map. Figure 2 gives an overview of how tree-based ORAM access works.
PATH-ORAM/CIRCUIT-ORAM scheme. In this work, we consider two popular tree-based constructions of ORAM which are PATH-ORAM [44] and CIRCUIT-ORAM [49] . While PATH-ORAM offers simple ReadPath and Evict operations, CIRCUIT-ORAM offers a smaller circuit complexity for the Evict procedure. Thus, CIRCUIT-ORAM is more efficient when implemented with Intel SGX. As noted in [42] , [28] , [49] , CIRCUIT-ORAM can operate with Z = 2 compared to Z = 4 as in PATH-ORAM; therefore, the server storage overhead is significantly reduced. Moreover, the size of stash in CIRCUIT-ORAM is smaller compared to the size of stash in PATH-ORAM; this allows a more efficient performance when scanning the stash as one needs to scan the whole path and stash to avoid side-channel leakage.
Recursive ORAM. In a non-recursive tree-based ORAM setting, the client has to store a position map of the size O(N ) bits. This approach, however, is not suitable for a resourceconstrained client. Stefanov et. al [44] presented a technique that reduces the size of the position map to O(1). The main idea of those constructions is to store a position map as another ORAM tree in the server side, and the client only keeps the position map of the new ORAM. The client keeps compressing the position map into another ORAM tree until the size of the position map is small enough to be saved on the client's storage. One main drawback of those constructions is the increased cost in the communication between a client and the server. Fortunately, in our setting, this cost can be safely ignored because the communication between client and server becomes the I/O access between TEE and the random access memory. Thus, it is more reasonable to use recursive constructions because it reduces the memory stored in the trusted region (e.g., Processor Reserved Memory).
C. Blockchain
The Bitcoin blockchain is a distributed data structure maintained by a group of nodes. In this work, to simplify the structure of the Bitcoin blockchain, we denote the network as a single party that maintains a growing database of Bitcoin blocks. On average of 10 minutes, the network outputs a Bitcoin block which is a combination of Bitcoin transactions and a block header. Each block header contains relevant information about the Bitcoin block such as Merkle root, nonce, network difficulty. The Merkle root can be used to verify the membership of Bitcoin transactions, and the nonce and difficulty are used to check the proof of work. Each Bitcoin transaction contains a set of inputs and outputs where transaction inputs are unused outputs of previous transactions.
• Unspent Transaction Output Database. In the Bitcoin network, the balance of a Bitcoin address is determined by values of those outputs that have not been used in other transactions. These outputs are called Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO). Moreover, in the implementation of common Bitcoin nodes such as Bitcoin core [1], Bitcoin nodes maintain a separate database that keeps track of all unspent transaction outputs and other metadata of the Bitcoin blockchain. This database is known as the UTXO set. Intuitively, a client with the knowledge of the secret key and the commitment value can query the UTXO set directly to obtain essential information such as transaction hash, position, and value to form new valid transactions. Therefore, in this work, we realize that if a full node can securely update and maintain the integrity of the UTXO set via while provides SPV clients with oblivious accesses to the UTXO set, the privacy of the SPV client is preserved.
• Bitcoin transaction types. In the Bitcoin blockchain, transactions are classified based on the structure of the input and output scripts. In particular, there are five types of standard script templates which are Pay-to-Pubkey (P2PK), Pay-to-PubkeyHash (P2PKH), Pay-to-ScriptHash (P2SH), Multisig, and Nulldata. Intuitively, scripting in Bitcoin provides a way to prove the ownership of the coins. In particular, a challenge script (scriptPubkey) is included as a part of the transaction output to specify the condition for its redemption, and a response script (scriptSig) is part of the transaction input to reveal the condition needed to redeem the bitcoins from other output.
In this work, we only consider two types of transaction: Payto-PubkeyHash (P2PKH) transaction and Pay-to-ScriptHash (P2SH) transaction. According to [21] , [35] , these two types of transaction make up of 97-99% of the UTXO set. Also, one can assume that the Pay-to-Pubkey-Hash transaction is one variant of the Pay-to-Script-Hash transaction because both transaction types require the spender's knowledge of the preimage of the hash digest before being able to spend those outputs. For simplicity, from this point on, we assume that the only information needed to obtain the unspent output is the public key hash, pkh. Moreover, all other transaction types such as Multisig and P2PK can be easily supported in the future.
• Block creation interval. The block creation time in Bitcoin is the time that the network takes to generate a new block, and block creation time is specified to be 10 minutes on average by the network. We call the waiting period between the most recent block and a new block, block creation interval. In this work, we discretize time as block creation intervals.
D. Threat Model
We assume that SPV clients are honest and rational which means that before during the block creation interval, a SPV client should not request the server for transaction outputs of a same public key hash more than once. The underlying remote attestation service provided by Intel is secure and trusted. The local attestation between enclaves is secure. The server and its programs are assumed to be untrusted except for programs running within an enclave.
We assume that the adversary who controls the operating system can read/inject/modify encrypted messages sent by enclaves. The adversary also can observe memory access patterns of both trusted and untrusted memory. Also, the computation power of the adversary is assumed to be limited. In particular, during block creation interval, the adversary should not have enough computation power to forge a new Bitcoin block that satisfies the current Bitcoin network difficulty. As the time of writing, the network difficulty [3] is around 6 × 10 9 ; therefore, the expected number of hashes to mine a Bitcoin block is roughly 2 72 .
The server's attacks on availability are out of scope. More specifically, denial of service (DoS) attacks by system admin and untrusted operating system are out of the scope. Otherwise, such adversary can prevent the enclaves from receiving new bitcoin block by shutting down the communication channel between the enclave and the Bitcoin network as the enclave has to rely on the untrusted OS to perform system calls such as file and network I/O.
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this section, we first describe how T 3 stores the UTXO set by exploring different mappings between the unspent transaction outputs and the ORAM blocks. We see that naive mapping may not be secure for blockchain applications as it may lead to denial of services attacks. Next, we demonstrate how Intel SGX can be considered as a trusted execution unit to access ORAM and perform read/write operations in an oblivious manner. Finally, we will describe how the system handles clients' requests during a write operation.
A. Storage Structure of the UTXO set
In the first step, we show how to map the public key hash to ORAM block identification and then describe the storage requirements in T 3 .
1) Bitcoin unspent transaction output mapping: In the design of T 3 , we assume that the SPV clients only know his/her addresses (i.e., the public key hashes); therefore, to return the outputs belonging to the client's address, the enclave needs to know the mapping between the address and the ORAM block identification.
In this work, we propose two simple mappings to store unspent outputs in the ORAM tree. More specifically, both approaches use standard cryptographic hash functions along with a secret key generated by the enclave. The first approach is to map a single Bitcoin address into a single ORAM block, and the second approach is to map a Bitcoin address into multiple ORAM blocks. We will later explain the trade-off between these two approaches. Intuitively, the first approach is more efficient in terms of performance and can be more expensive in terms of storage overhead. The second approach gives some flexibility in terms of storage overhead; however, to offer strong privacy to every address, this approach can be more expensive in terms of performance because it may incur more ORAM calls.
Single address into Single ORAM block. In this design, during the initialization, we require the program inside the enclave to use a keyed hash function to map the public key hash to ORAM block identification. The secret key of the hash function is generated and known only by the enclave. In other words, the mapping between a Bitcoin address to an ORAM block identification is known only to the SGX. We define the mapping as follow:
• bid ← OBlockMap(pkh, k b ): the function takes as input a 20-bytes hash digest pkh and a secret key k b , it outputs the block identification number bid ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}.
The key-hashing approach offers some flexibility when deciding the size of an ORAM blocks and the size of height of the ORAM tree. These two factors affect the size of the position map (resp. number of recursive levels) for non-recursive (resp. recursive) ORAM constructions. However, since the output domain of OBlockMap(·, ·) is limited to the size of the ORAM blocks, there will exist collisions. The following claim gives us a loose upper bound on the number of addresses that should be stored inside an ORAM block.
Claim 1: (Addresses per ORAM block) Let m be the number of public key hashes, N be the number of ORAM blocks. If the OBlockMap() acts as a truly random function, then the maximum number of addresses in each ORAM block is smaller than e · m/N with a probability 1 − 1/N .
Proof: This is a standard max-load analysis. We refer readers to [20] for detailed analysis. We note that there exists a tighter bound, but we use e · m/N bounds to simplify the equation.
Thus, if we limit each ORAM block to contain the outputs of at most e · m/N addresses, then the probability that every address is included is at least 1 − 1/N . Figure 3 gives us a high level overview of this approach.
Single address into Many ORAM blocks. Mapping a single address into a single ORAM block incurs less work on the server as it requires a single ORAM access for an address. However, if we want to allow each address to have more than one output, using the first approach implies that the storage overhead increase linearly because the first approach distribute unspent outputs based on its addresses. Therefore, we have to pad dummy data for those addresses that contain 1 outputs. Thus, we need a different mapping without linear increasing in storage overhead. To fix this shortcoming, the system needs to assign unspent outputs into ORAM block uniformly. One method is to allow a client to specify the number of ORAM accesses to obtain all of its unspent outputs as long as the number of requests does not exceed certain threshold. We define the mapping as follows: This approach also introduces some leakage as some addresses may contain more unspent outputs than others. Alternatively, the system can fix the value of δ ORAM accesses for all addresses with the expense of performance (i.e., one address incurs constant ORAM accesses). Similarly, the storage overhead of T 3 can be computed using the following claim: 2) Storage: In this system, we require the untrusted server to store three separate databases which are the read-once ORAM tree, the original ORAM tree, and the blockheader chain. In particular, Read-Once ORAM Tree serves as a dedicated storage to handle clients' requests. The structure of the tree is identical to the standard ORAM tree Original ORAM Tree is where all standard ORAM eviction operations are performed. In this work, we also require the enclave to maintain the Bitcoin Header Chain to verify the proof of work of the bitcoin block sent by other bitcoin client. The header chain is stored in the untrusted memory with integrity check.
B. Oblivious Read and Write Protocols
In T 3 , the SPV client is the party who invokes read accesses, and the Bitcoin network is the party who invokes write accesses. The TEE in the server is the one that performs both of those accesses on behalf of the client and the Bitcoin network.
1) Server System Components: Before explaining how oblivious read and write accesses work, we first start outlining the different components of our design. The server is initialized with different enclaves: Managing Enclave E m coordinates other enclaves and to handle requests from the clients. The managing enclave also handles the communication with other Bitcoin client or local Bitcoin client (bitcoind) via request procedure calls (RPC) to obtain Bitcoin blocks. Upon receiving the Bitcoin block, the managing enclave also verifies the integrity of the block using a separated header chain.
Reading Enclave E r is a dedicated enclave initialized by the managing enclave. It has a copy of ORAM position map and its own stash. The reading enclave operates on the readonce ORAM tree. Also, the reading enclave only performs ORAM ReadPath operations to obtain data while ORAM Eviction operations will be handled by the writing enclave.
Writing Enclave E w performs Eviction procedure for each read request, and performs ORAM writing accesses when a new Bitcoin block arrives from the Bitcoin network.
2) Oblivious read-once Protocol: Here, we describe how a remote client can perform a read access on the UTXO set.
Notation. First, let's denote K b to be the block mapping key, bid to be the ORAM block identification. We let (Enc, Dec) denote an authenticated encryption scheme. We assume that the the server has already been initialized with a writing enclave, E w and a managing enclave, E m . The managing enclave has a similar copy of the position map as the map in the writing enclave. Figure 5 presents the oblivious read protocol of T 3 . The oblivious read protocol can be described as follows:
1) The client establishes a secure channel with the managing enclave 1 : First, the client performs a remote attestation with the secure managing enclave, E m , and agrees on a session key, K s . The client encrypts his address along with the proof of ownership of that address, and sends the encrypted query to the server to be passed to E m . For simplicity, we assume that the plaintext only contains a public key hash, pkh, that the client is interested in, and the proof of ownership of the pkh is φ, C ← Enc Ks (pkh, φ). Note that there are different ways to prove the ownership of public key hash/addresses. In Bitcoin, if the public key is never revealed before, the proof of ownership can simply be the public key (i.e. φ = pk such that H(pk) = pkh). Alternatively, the system can enforce a client to provide the signature and the public key to prove the ownership of the public key hash.
2) The managing enclave initializes a reading enclave 2 : after receiving a client's request, E m initializes a dedicated reading enclave, E r to handle the client's future requests. Also, we require that the enclaves authenticate each other, and the existence of a secure channel between enclaves. Moreover, the reading enclave has its copy of the position map, its own stash, the block mapping key K b , and the agreed session key K s .
3) The managing enclave identifies and forwards ORAM Block ID to both reading and writing enclaves 2 : After decrypting the ciphertext (pkh, φ) ← Dec Ks (C), E m verifies the proof φ and pkh, then uses OBlockMap(·, ·) 2 function to learn the ORAM block ID, bid ← OBlockMap(pkh, K b ) where K b is the secret key generated by the enclave during initialization for mapping purposes. After obtaining the ORAM id, bid, the managing enclave forwards bid to the writing enclave for the eviction procedure, and forwards the (pkh, bid) to the reading enclave.
4)
The reading enclave performs read-once ORAM access on the read-once ORAM tree 3 : Based on the given bid, the reading enclave performs ORAM read only accesses on the ORAM tree to obtain the block. If the block contains the unspent output that belongs to the public key pkh, the reading enclave adds outputs into the response R. To mitigate the size leakage, the response R is padded with dummy data if there is no UTXO found.
5)
The reading enclave responds to the Client 4 -5 :
The enclave encrypts the response, R, using the session key K s then sends it to the client.
6)
The writing enclave performs the eviction procedure on the original ORAM tree 6 : After obtaining the bid from the managing enclave, the update enclave will perform a standard ORAM read accesses on the original ORAM tree. The goal of this procedure is to use the Eviction procedure inside standard ORAM operation to rerandomize the location of the actual block. No actual data is return in this step.
3) Oblivious Write Protocol:
In the Bitcoin network, miners generate a new Bitcoin block on average every 10 minutes. When the server receives a new block from the Bitcoin network, the managing enclave can obtain it from the bitcoin client. The E m verifies the integrity of the block by computing the Merkle root from transactions, then verifying the proof of work, and the writing enclave has to perform an update on the original ORAM tree; however, in the mean time, the system should be able to handle clients' requests during updates. We will explain how T 3 handles oblivious write accesses while handling clients' requests as follow: 2 for simplicity, we assume that the one-to-one mapping is used here Fig. 6 : Oblivious write protocol. During steps 1 -5 , the managing enclave receives and responds to SPV client request as usual. During steps 6 -8 , read requests from clients are queued up, and the managing enclave resume these requests after updating the read-once ORAM tree 1) The managing enclave verifies a new Bitcoin block 1 -3 : Once a bitcoin block arrives to the system from the Bitcoin network, the managing enclave E m can obtain it from the Bitcoin client. However, since the client runs outside the enclave, the enclave needs to verify the integrity of the new block by computing the Merkle root and verifying the proof of work to make sure that the block has not been tampered by the untrusted OS. For the detail of these computations, we refer readers to [2] . Moreover, as discussed in section IV-A, to verify a newly arrived block, the system is required to keep a separate block headers chain with integrity check in the untrusted memory. Once E m verifies the bitcoin block, E m starts pruning the transactions to obtain relevant information of the transactions' inputs and outputs. Then, E m uses OBlockMap(·, ·) to find the ORAM block identification to queue up ORAM write requests to the writing enclave. During this process, the oblivious read protocol performs as normal on the read-once ORAM tree.
2) The managing enclave sends write requests to the writing enclave 4 : Once the pruning process completes, the E m starts sending write requests based on data extracted from the bitcoin block to the writing enclave, E w . On otherhand, for each eviction request resulted from SPV client's requests, E m starts queuing up those eviction requests.
3) The writing enclave performs write accesses on the original ORAM tree 4 -5 : Upon receiving writing requests from E m , the E w performs all writing requests in the writing queue on the original ORAM tree.
4)
The writing enclave finishes all eviction requests queued up on the original ORAM tree 6 -7 : Once finished updating the tree, the E w signals E m to start queuing up clients' requests and performs all eviction requests incurred by SPV clients' read requests during update interval. Finally, when it finishes, it signals the E m to update the read-once ORAM tree and make a copy of the position map.
5)
The managing enclave performs an update the readonce ORAM tree and the original ORAM tree and enclave metadata 8 : In particular, E m discards the current copy of the read-once ORAM tree, and makes 2 identical copies of the most updated original ORAM tree. One is used as read-once ORAM tree, and the other is used as original ORAM tree. Also, the new position map and new stash are updated for the managing enclave. Once this process is finished, E m starts answering SPV clients' requests again. Figure 6 gives us an overview of the oblivious write protocol.
Discussion
The core idea of the oblivious update protocol is to minimize the downtime of T 3 during the update process. More specifically, during step 1 -5 , T 3 still allows SPV clients to query the system while from step 6 -8 , T 3 stops accepting clients' requests in order to synchronize both trees. This approach introduces some delay; however, the system downtime is minimized to the same amount of time it takes for the writing enclave to finish all eviction requests.
V. EVALUATION AND COMPARISON
In this section, we describe our configuration, our experimental results, and the storage overhead of the system based on the analysis of the UTXO set on the Bitcoin blockchain. Moreover, we give a comparison between T 3 and the current existing SPV solution in term of performance and communication overhead. Finally, we address the capabilities of T 3 compared to other related works.
A. Configuration
Software. We implemented our system with C++ using Intel SGX SDK v2.0. The implementation of the ORAM controller is built on top the Zerotrace [42] implementation. In order to handle the communication with the Bitcoin network, we have used libjson-rpc-cpp [6] framework to build C++ wrapper functions to communicate with the Bitcoin daemon (bitcoind [1]) from inside the enclave through JSON-RPC calls. For extracting the UTXO database, we used the bitcoin-tool implementation proposed in [21] . This allows us to save time during the initialization phase. Finally, we used python-bitcoinlib [8] to compare the performance of T 3 with the current existing SPV solution.
Database. To reduce the time of initializing both ORAM trees from the genesis block, we used bitcoin-tool implementation proposed in [21] to extract 3.2GB of the Bitcoin UTXO set in February 2019.
We have downloaded a snapshot of the Bitcoin blockchain including block 0 to 551, 731, containing a total of 58, 156, 895 Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO). Figure 7 shows the distribution of the unspent transaction outputs per address. We see that more than 90% of the addresses have less than three UTXOs. In our prototype, we considered at most two UTXOs per wallet ID. This results in covering more than 92% of all the UTXOs per wallet ID. Also, as discussed in section IV, by using different mapping, one can cover more percentage of Bitcoin addresses.
Hardware. We evaluated the performance of T 3 on a desktop which is equipped with Intel(R) Xeon(R) Silver 4116 CPU @ 2.10GHz, 128GB RAM. Since Intel(R) Xeon(R) silver 4116 is not SGX-enabled CPU, we obtain the performance results by running our implementation in the simulation mode. However, we expect to not have much of a performance difference when executing in the two different modes. More specifically, we have tested the performance of T 3 using a smaller ORAM tree in the hardware mode on a commodity desktop equipped with SGX-enabled Intel Core i7. Comparing the hardware and simulation mode results (i.e., simulation on the Intel Core i7 CPU), we see no noticeable difference in the running time of both read-once and standard ORAM accesses.
B. Experimental Results
We have implemented T 3 using multiple threads. As reported in [27] , [45] , as long as the total amount of memory used by all threads does not exceed the EPC limit, the performance gain should be similar to the use of different enclaves. In this work, we implemented all functionalities in one single enclave, and we used multiple threads to concurrently accesses the ORAM trees.
System parameters We tested our system with both recursive PATH-ORAM and recursive CIRCUIT-ORAM using different tree size N = 2 20 , 2 21 , 2 22 , 2 23 , 2 24 . We allow each Bitcoin address to have up to 2 unspent transaction outputs, and we use the single address into single ORAM block mapping approach described in section IV-A to map addresses into ORAM block. Finally, we use claim 1 to determine the size of each ORAM block.
Performance of read-once and standard ORAM accesses. In T 3 , the reading enclave performs read-once accesses to handle client's requests in an efficient manner. Table I presents an overall performance of a standard ORAM access as well as the performance of a read-once access for both CIRCUIT-ORAM and PATH-ORAM. For this experiment, we took the average running time of 10000 accesses.
As shown in the results, ORAM constructions with smaller block sizes provides a better performance in both schemes. The reason is that oblivious operations like oblivious comparisons and cmov-based stash scan are more efficient because of a smaller size stash. Moreover, CIRCUIT-ORAM gives a better performance compared to PATH-ORAM, as it can operate on a smaller block compared to PATH-ORAM, and this requires much smaller stash size allowing much faster oblivious execution.
Parallelization. Since there is no race condition in the readonce accesses, the design of T 3 allows different threads to concurrently perform read-once accesses on the read-once ORAM tree. Compared to other oblivious system like BITE [42] , T 3 is able to handle bursty client read requests concurrently while the eviction requests are distributed sequentially during the block creation interval. To measure this performance gain, we used multiple threads to access the read-once enclave and perform read-once access simultaneously on a tree of size N = 2 24 and ORAM block of size 544 bytes. Table II shows the performance of T 3 implemented using multiple threads for both CIRCUIT-ORAM and PATH-ORAM.
Comparison to current SPV solutions. We give a comparison in term of performance and communication overhead over several number of requests to the existing SPV client's solution and to BITE [9] Oblivious database. 1) Performance: Figure 8 gives us an overview of the performance of T 3 compared to the performance of the current existing SPV with Bloom filter solution and the performance of Bite Oblivious database. In particular, it shows the response latency from the client's perspective. In this comparison, a request for the SPV solution with Bloom filter solution means the time the server takes to scan one Bitcoin block, and a request for T 3 and BITE means the time it takes to perform an ORAM access on the ORAM tree. For the current SPV clients with Bloom filter, we set the false positive rate of the Bloom filter to 1.0% and 5.0% respectively. For T 3 , we used N = 2 24 and block of size 544 bytes for both PATH-ORAM with Z = 4 and CIRCUIT-ORAM with Z = 2. For BITE database, based on our understand of their construction, we re-implemented BITE using non-recursive construction of PATH-ORAM, and we used the same ORAM block of size 32kB which leads to the number of block is N = 2 17 . Also, we also provide an additional construction of BITE which is implemented using recursive PATH-ORAM and suggested parameters for T 3 where the tree is of size 2 24 and block of size 544B. Figure 8 gives us the overall performance of three existing solutions.
The performance of T 3 outperforms the SPV with Bloom filter solution. The reason is that in T 3 , the system relies on the TEE to handle the integrity checking of the Bitcoin block before updating the ORAM tree while in the current SPV solution, the full client needs to scan the Bloom filter every time and detect the relevant transactions and recompute the Merkle path for each of those transactions. Also, T 3 performs much better than BITE oblivious database as the BITE system does not consider the use of recursive ORAM construction. Another reason is that the size of the ORAM block used in Bite is large; hence, the cost of oblivious operation like cmov-based stash scan becomes more expensive. Thus, we envision and realize an improved construction of BITE using recursive construction of PATH-ORAM to demonstrate the practical impact of using recursive ORAM construction on TEE with restricted memories.
2) Communication Overhead: In term of communication between client and server, T 3 offers much lower communication overhead compared to the existing solution for SPV clients. T 3 does not need to provide the SPV clients with the Merkle proofs to its relevant transactions because all those proofs are validated by the Intel SGX before being added the ORAM tree. Thus, one can reduce both the amount of work that the full node needs to perform and the amount of data that it needs to send to the SPV clients. Moreover, T 3 prunes all other information of transactions to extract only relevant data needed for client to determine balance and form new transactions, while in the current SPV solution, due to the false positive rate used in the Bloom filter, the full client may send additional irrelevant information to the SPV client. Figure 9 shows an overview of the communication cost of T 3 compared to the current solution. To give an estimation of the communication cost of the current SPV solution, we assumed that each request requires a separate Merkle proof. Hence, for each request, the size of the proof is at least: log 2 (NoTXs)·32 bytes where NoTXs is the number of transactions in one block. Moreover, the size of the transaction data is approximately fpr·BlockSize bytes where the fpr is the false positive rate and the BlockSize is the size of the Bitcoin block. To compute the overhead cost we used block 551731, as an example, which has block size of 1149 KB and contains 3017 transactions. However, in practice, we would expect the Bitcoin blocks to have different sizes; resulting, the communication cost to be different across blocks. Therefore, the results in fig. 9 is only an estimation on the communication overhead using the current SPV solution. We omit the comparison to the communication overhead of BITE because both T 3 and BITE return a fixed amount a data to the SPV client which is the output itself.
Storage Overhead As noted in the previous section, using ORAM incurs a constant size blow up of the storage of the UTXOs (e.g., ≈ 3 − 4× for CIRCUIT-ORAM, 6 − 8× for PATH-ORAM). In particular, for PATH-ORAM with Z = 4, the storage cost of ORAM trees is about ≈ 51GB, and for CIRCUIT-ORAM with Z = 2, the storage cost of two ORAM tree is around ≈ 26GB. For the EPC memory usage, we need to consider the size of the position map and the stash used by each enclave. In this work, since we use recursive ORAM constructions for both schemes, the size of the position map can be as small as possible at the cost of storing more recursive ORAM trees in the untrusted memory region. Precisely, in the prototype of our implementation, each thread uses 8KB for the position map and a stash of size 2·log(N )·Z ·BlockSize bytes (e.g., for a tree of size N = 2 24 , we use ≈ 0.62MB bytes for PATH-ORAM, and ≈ 0.31 MB for CIRCUIT-ORAM). Thus, as long as the total memory usage by all threads/enclaves does not exceed the EPC limit (e.g., 96MB), the performance of the system will not suffer from the expensive swapping operations discussed in section III-A. Moreover, for integrity protection, T 3 only requires the server to store the Bitcoin header chain which is approximately 44MB instead of storing a complete Bitcoin blockchain. Thus, in the future work, if T 3 can handle the communication with the Bitcoin network without the reliance on the existing Bitcoin client, T 3 reduces the need of storing the 230 GB of Bitcoin blockchain.
C. Comparison with Other Oblivious Systems
Here we provide a comparison between T 3 and other generic oblivious systems. We compare our work with BITE [9] Oblivious Database that also uses ORAM and TEE to provide a generic PIR system for Bitcoin client, CONCURORAM [14] that provides concurrency access to ORAM clients, OBLIVIATE [10] that prevents leakage from file system accesses, and ZEROTRACE which proposes an efficient generic oblivious memory access primitives. In particular, section V-C compares those systems based on the capabilities of supporting concurrency access, enabling recursive construction, and preventing side-channel leakage.
For generic trusted hardware-based systems like BITE oblivious database and OBLIVIATE, while providing protection against side-channel leakage, those systems do not consider the use of recursive ORAM construction to reduce the EPC memory usage. Hence, the performance of their systems will degrade once the database becomes too large. Other works that harnesses the use of recursive ORAM construction are ZERO-TRACE; however, concurrency is not supported in the current version of ZEROTRACE. Thus, without concurrency support, such systems will not scale well to handle Bitcoin SPV clients. CONCURORAM is a recent ORAM construction that offers concurrency accesses from the clients; however, due to more optimized eviction strategy and complex synchronization schedule, the recursive construction of CONCURORAM introduces implementation challenges. Nevertheless, we believe that it can be an interesting future work to use CONCURORAM in the design of T 3 .
VI. SYSTEM ANALYSIS
A. Security Claims
In order to prove the security properties of T 3 's design, we put forth six claims, each of which represents the security of a major component of T 3 in term of privacy goal.
Claim 1. The managing enclave does not leak user-related information to an attacker. The managing enclave is responsible for three tasks -(a) converting wallet IDs to UTXOs, (b) creating and managing threads which will perform read operations on the read-once ORAM tree, and (c) handle the updates to be performed on the original ORAM tree.
Firstly, the conversion of wallet IDs to their respective UTXOs is private since the channel between clients and the managing enclave is secured by the shared key during the remote attestation process. More importantly, when receiving addresses from a client, the managing enclave uses blockmapping function (described in IV-A1) to map each address to a fixed number of ORAM blocks. This does not reveal information about the number of outputs belonging to an address. Secondly, each read thread performs the same operations irrespective of the wallet ID provided to it, i.e., each thread simply retrieves an ORAM block using ORAM accesses implemented with cmovbased oblivious executions. Lastly, the only thing revealed by the update process of T 3 is the number of blocks updated into the Write Tree. However, this is public information and T 3 does not try to hide it. Each update is performed using an ORAM access which ensures that the attacker is unaware of the final position of each block. Claim 2. The optimized read operations on read-once ORAM tree do not leak information. As explained in section IV-B2, the read-once ORAM tree is accessed using an optimized read operation which chooses not to shuffle and write-back the retrieved path to the read-once ORAM tree. However, this is secure since each path corresponding to a UTXO can only be accessed once during a read interval and will be shuffled before the next interval.
Claim 3. The write operations performed on the original ORAM tree do not leak information. There are two specific operations performed on the original ORAM tree-(a) the UTXOs are updated based on the updated bitcoin block, and (b) the previously accessed ORAM blocks are shuffled. However, all of these updating accesses are standard ORAM operations implemented in a side-channel-resistant manners as previously done by [42] , [10] . Therefore, all write operations reveal no information about a user's UTXO.
Claim 4. The data fetched from the untrusted world to the TEE is correct. There are two major sources of data transferred from the untrusted to the trusted world -(a) the updated block fetched from the bitcoin daemon after a fixed interval and (b) the ORAM tree blocks which are fetched from the untrusted world into the TEE. As mentioned in IV-B3, Bitcoin blocks are fetched from outside the enclave. However, T 3 verifies the integrity of the Bitcoin block based on the proof of work and the header chain, and since the cost of producing a valid block is expensive, we argue that T 3 should be able to obtain valid block from the Bitcoin network. Also, T 3 maintains a Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) of the ORAM trees and therefore prevents malicious tampering by verifying all encrypted data fetched from the untrusted memory using the MHT. All encrypted data fetched from the untrusted memory is verified using the MHT.
Claim 5. The multiple threads involved do not create synchronization issues. Here, it is worth-noting that multiple threads are only involved while accessing the Read Tree of T 3 . Thanks to the optimized read operation, T 3 does not run into synchronization bugs since there is no memory region that could be simultaneously written to by more than one thread. In particular, each thread shares the position map but only reads from the position map. Each thread contains its own stash memory which is written to separately by each thread. Claim 6. The memory interactions within the enclave are side-channel-resistant. The design of T 3 incorporates defenses against the side-channel threats [51] , [31] , [32] plaguing Intel SGX. In particular, we used ORAM operations to hide all data access patterns on the untrusted memory region, and we incorporated similar oblivious operation techniques introduced in [40] , [10] , [42] to prevent operations inside the enclave from leaking sensitive information. Finally, the implementation of T 3 is also secure against branch-prediction attacks since each individual operation (e.g., accessing Read Tree, updating Write Tree etc.) takes the same sequence of branches and therefore reveals no information to the attacker, from the accessed branches.
B. Denial of Service Attacks from Malicious Clients
While the design of T 3 is pratical, a malicious client can still incur a large processing time on the server by creating lots of addresses and sending large number of requests for those requests. One way to mitigate such attack is to apply fees on users of the service. Another approach to mitigate denial of service attack is to use a cuckoo filter [24] to load all addresses from the UTXO set. Upon receiving requests from client, the managing enclave can verify if the address matches the filter as well as the proof of ownership of that address before performing ORAM accesses. Moreover, since Cuckoo filter data structure supports deletion operation, the system can add and remove addresses when performs updating. In other word, in order to perform the denial of service attack, clients need both the proof of ownership as well as a certain amount of Bitcoin in each address. Hence, it will cost more for the client to perform such attack.
C. Other Goals Achieved by T 3
In this subsection, in addition to the Privacy goal describe in section VI-A, we explain how T 3 achieves the other goals mentioned in subsection II-B.
Validity. Under the assumption that the adversary does not have enough computational power to form a new Bitcoin block, the system will only obtain valid transaction by verifying the Merkle root and the proof of work of the Bitcoin block.
Completeness. By offering different ways of mapping between Bitcoin addresses and ORAM block id, we can offer services to 92−96% of all clients with some trade-off between storage overhead and performance.
Efficiency. Our contribution to efficiency is threefold. First, our system is able to handle bursty requests from client concurrently. The core idea is to separate the effect of a standard ORAM access into different enclaves. Thus, the multiple reading enclave can concurrently perform read operations at the same time that the writing enclave can perform a nonblocking Evict procedure on the other tree. Second, by having two ORAM trees, we minimize the downtime of the system by having the writing enclave performed updates on one tree and reading enclave handled clients' requests on the other tree. The server downtime depends on the number of requests that the system receives when the writing enclave performs ORAM updates on the original ORAM tree. Finally, by enforcing clients to provide the proof of ownership of the address and assuming that a honest client is rational, we prevent other clients from querying addresses that do not belong to them.
VII. RELATED WORK
General SGX Systems. Haven [12] is a pioneering work on SGX computing enabling native application SGX porting on windows. Graphene [15] provides a linux-based LibOS for SGX programs. Ryoan [29] retrofits Native Client to provide sandboxing mechanisms for Intel SGX. Eleos [38] provides a user-space extension of enclave memory using custom encryption. T 3 uses some concepts from Eleos especially in the way we store the ORAM tree using custom encryption outside the SGX enclave.
SGX Side-channels.
There are three main memorybased side-channel vulnerabilities disclosed within Intel SGX, namely, page table-based attacks [51] , cache-based attacks [13] , and branch-prediction attacks [31] . Furthermore, since SGX relies on the untrusted OS for system-call handling, it is also vulnerable to IAGO attacks [16] . Leaky Cauldron [48] presents an overview of the possible attack vectors against SGX programs. T 3 is secure against all disclosed memorybased side-channels since it uses oblivious RAM (ORAM) to protect the access-patterns. Furthermore, T 3 uses oblivious memory primitives to secure the runtime ORAM operations as well as its library.
Oblivious Systems. Raccoon [40] provided a technique to protect a small part of a user program against all digital side-channels. OBLIVIATE [10] and ZEROTRACE [42] used ORAM-based operations to protect files and data arrays respectively inside Intel SGX. Thang Hoang et al. [28] proposed a combination of TEE and ORAM to design oblivious search and update platform for large dataset. Eskandarian et a. [23] leveraged Intel SGX and Path ORAM to propose oblivious SQL database management system.
Recently, Chakraborti et al. proposed a new parallel ORAM scheme called ConcurORAM [14] . Similar to the T 3 design, ConcurORAM also uses two-tree structure to propose a non-blocking eviction procedure, and the system periodically synchronizes two trees to maintain the privacy of the user's access pattern. In ConcurORAM, the scheme requires the client to download the query log and the result log to learn about ongoing queries before requesting ORAM accesses. Hence, if we combine ConcurORAM along with Intel SGX to design this system, the use of query and result logs introduces additional storage overhead to the limited storage capacity of the Intel SGX. More importantly, the author also noted that ConcurORAM cannot be trivially extended to a recursive ORAM construction because of concurrent data structure accesses. However, if ConcurORAM can be implemented into a recursive ORAM construction, we believe that ConcurORAM can be an interesting alternate solution for the ORAM scheme used in the design of T 3 .
Another interesting parallel ORAM construction is Tao-Store [41] . TaoStore assumes a trusted proxy that handles concurrent client's requests, and the proxy runs a scheduler to make sure that there are no conflicting queries while preventing no information leakage. However, similar to ConcurORAM, the implementation of TaoStore is limited to the non-recursive construction of Path ORAM which is not suitable when combining with TEE with limited trusted memory capacity. This work aims to design a simpler design that is suitable for any flavor of tree-based ORAM schemes.
TEE for cryptocurrencies. The research community has investigated different ways of combining TEE with blockchain to both improve privacy and scalability of blockchains. Obscuro [46] is a Bitcoin transaction mixer implemented in Intel SGX that addresses the linkability issue of Bitcoin transactions. Teechan [33] is an off-chain payment micropayment channel that harnesses TEE to increase transaction throughput of Bitcoin. Bentov et al. proposed a new design that uses Intel SGX to build a real-time cryptocurrency exchange. Another example is the Towncrier system [52] that uses TEE for securely transferring data to smart contract. Another prominent example is Ekiden [17] which proposed off-chain smart contract execution using TEE. Finally, ZLite [50] system is another example which used ORAM and TEE to provide SPV clients with oblivious access. However, similar to BITE, ZLite employed non-recursive PATH-ORAM as it is, and thus, the scalability and efficiency of the system is inherently limited due to the non-concurrent accesses.
Osuntokun et al. [39] recently present a new proposal for Bitcoin SPV clients. This proposal is the building block for systems like Neutrino. In particular, each block will have its own Bloom filter. The SPV client first fetches the filter from the full client and decides to download the block from another client if transactions of interested are in the block. This approach, however, introduces an additional communication overhead to the client. In particular, a client with lots of transactions scattered among different blocks needs to download lots of full blocks, and performing verification of block can be expensive for the resource-constrained client. This approach does not necessarily provide more privacy for the SPV client as the full client still learn the block that the addresses belong to.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a system design that supports a large-scale oblivious search on unspent transaction outputs for Bitcoin SPV clients while efficiently maintains the state of the Bitcoin UTXO set via an oblivious update protocol. Our design leverages the TEE capabilities of Intel SGX to provide strong privacy and security guarantees to Bitcoin SPV client even with the presence of a potentially malicious server. Moreover, by putting reasonable assumptions on the accessing frequency of the SPV clients, we present novel ORAM construction that offers both privacy and efficiency to the clients. We showed that the prototype of the system is much more efficient than the use of standard ORAM construction as it is. In particular, due to the use of two ORAM trees in the design of T 3 , we improve the performance of an ORAM access by two time and allow the system to handle concurrent client's requests. Also, our implementation shows one order of magnitude performance gain when combining recursive ORAM construction the current existing construction to stress the importance of using recursive ORAM construction in TEE with restricted memory. Finally, while the applicability of T 3 in cryptocurrencies beyond Bitcoin is apparent, we believe our work will motivate further research on oblivious memory with the restricted access patterns.
